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Abstract 
The study aims to examine the relationship between corporate governance and risk 
management in Kenyan non-financial companies. It samples 41 listed non-financial firms in 
Kenya for the period of 2010-2017. Utilising binary logistic regression analysis technique, 
the study finds out that board independence and CEO tenure have negative and significant 
effects on risk management at 1% statistical significance level; while board financial 
expertise has a positive and significant effect on risk management 5% statistical 
significance level. 
The study concludes that the independence of board members is detrimental to hedging 
activities. Long-tenured CEOs are less likely to use financial derivatives tools to hedge risks 
while financially knowledgeable boards have a better understanding of the sophisticated 
financial tools involved in risk management mechanisms. The study recommends the 
reduction of board members' independence and CEO tenure in order to increase hedging 
activities. The board members must have financial expertise, so that they can ascertain 
risks which are valuable to shareholders. 
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Agency Theory. 
JEL Classification: G20, G30, G32. 
 
 
                                                          
* E-mail address: tarus9116@gmail.com 
 
Journal of Economics and Financial Analysis 
Type: Double Blind Peer Reviewed Scientific Journal 
Printed ISSN: 2521-6627 | Online ISSN: 2521-6619 
Publisher: Tripal Publishing House | DOI:10.1991/jefa.v4i1.a33 
Received: 29.01.2020 | Accepted: 26.07.2020 | Published: 28.08.2020 
 Journal homepage: ojs.tripaledu.com/jefa 
T.K. Tarus / JEFA Vol:4 No:1 (2020) 79-97 
 
Page | 80 
 
1. Introduction 
Following corporate failures in 2007-2008, several governance initiatives 
were suggested to enhance corporate governance, with a considerable focus on 
the concept of managing risk. In this respect, the use of financial derivatives tools 
(risk management proxy) to mitigate risk has become progressively important due 
to increased risk uncertainty and the development of legislative frameworks 
among corporations (Lechner & Gatzert, 2018). The establishment of robust risk 
appetite at all levels of enterprise (Gatzert and Martin, 2015) is essential to ensure 
appropriate synchronization and functionality of the management of risk. The 
comprehensive perspective for a corporate risk portfolio is expected to create 
benefits for business by optimizing their risk-return trade-off and hence creating a 
long-term competitive advantage as compared to firms that identify, monitor, and 
manage risks independently (Nocco and Stulz, 2006).  
Risk management has been developed as a critical success factor and a major 
concern for firms (Grove and Clouse, 2016) because financial management 
involves the management of risk using a varied set of financial tools. Traditionally, 
the risk management tool consisted of portfolio diversification, which was 
common in previous years. However, in the early 1980s, new tools were 
developed in the form of financial transactions called derivatives (Grove and 
Clouse, 2016). Derivatives tools are important elements of the global economy 
with an estimated market size surpassing $700 trillion by 2001 (Bartram et al., 
2009). International Swaps Derivatives Association survey of 2009 reports, 94 
percent of the world’s 500 biggest corporations employ derivatives to manage 
corporate risks. Therefore, an effective risk management structure is perceived to 
aid the organization realized its business objectives, enhance its financial 
reporting as well as safeguarding its reputation. Miccolis & Shah (2000) pointed 
out that managers need to manage financial tools that stimulate risk so that they 
can pursue strategic advantage and opportunities attributed to the risks. During 
periods of uncertainty and global financial unrest, the function of risk 
management becomes more essential for company activities (Grote, 2015).  
Recovering from the shocks of corporate fiascos, representatives and 
stakeholders are demanding better oversight from organizations particularly from 
the board of directors for managing and taking responsibility for key risks which 
firms faced (Maruhun et al., 2018). They further noted that poor corporate 
governance mechanisms have been identified as the main cause of risk 
management failure and thus contributed to the global decline of major 
companies. The impact of the economic crisis had been the wake-up call for most 
firms when they were unprepared and surprised by the extensions of the debacle 
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(Harner, 2010). The literature has disclosed that the connection between 
corporate governance and financial risk management aided companies to 
recognize the risks, mitigate, and handle those risks in an appropriate way 
(Zahiruddin & Norlida, 2013). Management of risk is a crucial mechanism in the 
company governance framework used as a surveillance instrument to align the 
principal-agent link to reduce the agency issues (Maruhun et al., 2018). 
According to Hentschel & Kothari,(2001) they postulated that over time 
corporate governance aspects have improved risk management activities such as 
identifying, measuring, and monitoring as well as estimating the efficiency of 
management controls in managing risks. Nevertheless, despite Kenya's capital 
market improvement on corporate governance, recent studies in the Kenyan 
markets have focused on the challenges facing the introduction of derivative tools 
and reasons why Kenyan firms do not employ derivatives in risk management. 
According to Murungi et al., (2014), financial derivatives usage among Kenyan 
firms is low because of managerial skepticism, limited derivative microstructure, 
and limited knowledge on the availability of derivative instruments. Other studies 
(Kintu and Ngugi, 2013; Livingstone and Ngugi, 2019) report that Kenyan listed 
firms exercise a variety of derivative instruments to manage financial risks. 
Despite research in advanced nations (Bartram et al., 2009; Allayannis et al., 2012; 
Asghar, 2018), the impact of corporate governance and financial risk management 
in the Kenyan context has not been adequately documented. To fill this gap and 
contribute to the body of knowledge, this research attempted to explore the link 
between corporate governance mechanisms and risk management in Kenyan non-
financial listed firms. 
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
The Corporate Governance framework according to Fama and Jensen, (1983) has its 
roots in agency theory derived from the idea of separating ownership and control. In this 
regard, the theory, therefore, contracts with the resolution of problems occurring between 
the principal and the agent. In most cases, agents are delegated to act in the best interest 
of the principal, but occasionally they may fail and be concerned with advancing their 
interests resulting in sometimes denoted agency conflict as the agency problem. To 
minimize this agency conflict (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), a contract is commonly 
executed between the principal and the agent. The focus of agency theory on the 
relationship between the principal and agent has created uncertainty owing to numerous 
information asymmetries (Deegan, 2004). This implies that the separation of ownership 
from running the firm can lead to managers taking action that may not maximize 
shareholders’ wealth due to their firm-specific knowledge and know-how which may 
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benefit them and not the shareholders thus monitoring mechanism is intended to protect 
the owners' interest (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
The agency problem of risk management occurs when the principal and the agent 
have different views on the amount of residual risk to be borne by the entity. According to 
Smith and Stulz (1985), agents will incline to be more risk-averse than the shareholders of 
the company because a bigger portion of their assets together with their human capital will 
be connected to the company's accomplishment and continuing existence. Given their 
command over working strategies, executives have the authority to set the level of risk that 
maximizes their usefulness concerning the level that maximizes shareholder value 
(Jankensgard, 2019).The theory also clarifies a probable discrepancy between owners, 
managers, and debt holders due to asymmetries in income distribution, which can result in 
the business taking too much danger (Mayers and Smith, 1987). Agency theory 
subsequently shows that hedging policies have a significant impact on shareholder value 
(Fite and Pfleiderer, 1995). Finally, agency theory delivers strong support on hedging as a 
reaction to the divergence between managerial incentives and shareholders' concerns. This 
basic principal-agent model can also create information asymmetry, which allows 
managers to withhold important information to maximize personal interests (Godfrey et 
al., 2003). 
 
3. Literature Review 
3.1. Board Independence and Risk Management 
Agency theory advocates claim that a board with a substantial amount of non-
executive directors has a better chance to operate in the best interests of shareholders and 
improving risk management through efficient supervision of management functions (Klein, 
2002). The independence of the board relates to the ratio of non-executive directors to the 
total number of executives on the board (Reddy et al., 2008). The argument about the 
need for non-executive directors is grounded on agency theory where shareholders have 
no control over the company’s day-to-day operations (Mizruchi, & Stearns, 1988; Hillman 
and Dalziel, 2003) while executives are seen to possess the firm-specific understanding and 
managerial skills. A potential conflict of interest requires monitoring procedures aimed at 
safeguarding the interests of the shareholder owners of the company (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976).Greater representation of autonomous managers on the board enhances 
the level of control and enables the board to conduct its strategic tasks more efficiently 
(Coles et al., 2001). 
Previous studies present mixed evidence on how board independence affects firm 
risk. The study by Pathan (2009) discovered that powerful boards have a positive and 
significant impact on firm risk. Also, Borokhovich et al., 2004 discovered a significant and 
T.K. Tarus / JEFA Vol:4 No:1 (2020) 79-97 
 
Page | 83 
 
positive connection in their research between the number of derivatives used by 
corporations and the percentage of external directors on the board. More results by Tai et 
al., (2014) indicated that the percentage of autonomous managers was significantly and 
positively linked to the hedging operations of the firm among non-financial companies. 
However, Brick and Chidambaran (2008) report a negative association between board 
independence and firm combined hedging. In line with their results, Osuoha and Osuoha 
(2015) discovered that board independence had a negative and significant impact on the 
relationship between corporate governance and derivatives utilization. Marsden and 
Prevost (2005) pointed out that companies with a greater proportion of autonomous 
managers on the board tend to reduce derivatives used as a means of risk management. 
Some studies found that board independence is insignificantly related to derivative 
utilization in risk management (Ho et al., 2013).According to the research by Dionne and 
Triki (2013), they discovered that the percentage of autonomous managers on the board 
has no significant effect on the decision to hedge in their study. Moreover, Shiu et al., 
(2009) also discovered that the proportion of autonomous outside executives on the board 
is insignificantly linked to risk management. Thus, based on this inconclusive and absence 
of results on how the presence of non-executive members in the board affects risk 
management this study hypothesized that; 
H1: Board independence has no significant effect on risk management 
 
3.2. CEO Tenure and Risk Management 
Previous studies by (Payne et al., 2009; Vafeas, 2003) highlighted the importance of 
the tenure of CEOs who expressed that a long-term tenure increases the performance of 
the board as it is linked with higher expertise, dedication, and understanding about the 
enterprise and its company environment. In the context of corporate governance, Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) tenure refers to the number of years that the CEO has been in the 
company (Souder et al., 2012).  The findings by Lewellyn & Muller-Kahle (2012) revealed 
that CEO tenure was statistically significant and negatively related to the firm’s decision to 
perform risk management actions. According to Campbell et al., (2011) on their study 
found that tenured CEO has a negative and significantly associated with risk management. 
In another study by Chen and Zheng (2014), they found that an entrenched CEO may enjoy 
the benefits of more control hence they might become less motivated to make risky 
decisions  
In the same line, Tufano (1996) argued that newly appointed CEOs were more 
motivated to implement risk management procedures based on the use of derivatives. 
Results based on 48 companies in his study disclosed that the length of CEO tenure was 
significantly and positively associated with the application of risk management. According 
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to Xu (2011), the results showed that CEO tenure is positively associated with capital 
expenditure and research and development expenditure, and CEOs do not perform better 
when they have a shorter horizon and an influence on investment. Brennan and Conroy 
(2013) found that the longer-tenured CEO the more likely a CEO is to consider risky 
alternatives instruments for hedging purposes. Belkhir (2006) indicated that a manager 
may be more conservative behavior and want to protect his job hence CEO would be 
inherently cautious based on individual human capital in the company. Moreover, Bebchuk 
and Spamann (2010) suggested that CEOs playing the dominant roles and they tend to 
make more risk-averse decisions. Pathan, (2009) provides that a CEO has more power to 
influence any decisions of the board and take the lower risk because managers have un-
diversifiable wealth including human capital and comparatively fixed salary. However, 
Dionne and Triki (2013) argue that CEO tenure is insignificant related to hedging decisions 
when using the delta percentage as the hedge variable in the gold mining industry. 
According to Boubaker et al., (2010), the likelihood of derivatives usage decreases with the 
number of years spent by the CEO in the firm which is negatively and statistically 
insignificant. Malmendier et al., (2011) found an insignificant result for the relationship 
between CEO tenure and risk management. 
H1: CEO tenure has no significant effect on risk management 
 
3.3. Board Financial Expertise and Risk Management 
Following the latest wave of accounting scandals, regulators have stressed the need 
for more financial experts on boards arguing that they will need to havestronger board 
supervision and serve the interests of shareholders (Guneret al., 2008).Corporations that 
lack the financial expertise of board members played a major role in the crisis period 
(Kirkpatrick, 2009). Financial experts must have the ability to oversee accounting controls 
and the financial reporting of the firm, thus preventing possible reporting failures, litigation, 
and scrutiny from policymakers. Those directors specializing in different industries monitor 
and advise firms in those sectors because their financial expertise gives them an edge 
(Guneret al., 2008). Besides, Fama and Jensen (1983) indicated that since the board was 
mandated to oversee the organization, they were needed to have the understanding that 
would enable them to execute their responsibilities perfectly. To monitor the process of 
financial reporting, the directors must have accounting knowledge, to control 
manipulation, and to make information more transparent (Yunos et al., 2012). 
Financial knowledge is crucial to comprehend the company's complicated operations 
and the risks connected with the company's policies, but sometimes company boards 
lacked sufficient financial expertise to identify and control exposures to risk (Srivastav & 
Hagendorff, 2016). When there is a shortfall of knowledge, many board members remain 
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silent to save face, which makes them ineffective. In reality, boards of members do often 
lack in-depth know-how in auditing, risk management, and communication (Hilb, 
2005).Among a broad spectrum of abilities that managers may have, Chhaochharia and 
Grinstein (2007) proposed that financial literacy is crucial in any board to work efficiently. 
According to Harris & Raviv (2008), they indicated that board financial experts have 
reduced expenses in obtaining data about the complexity and related risks of certain 
financial operations and are therefore better prepared to track senior management 
effectively. They also observed that a more financially knowledgeable board can 
acknowledge risks that are unsound for the firm's economic stability and advise senior 
executives to prevent such risks. Badolato et al., (2014) report that financial expertise is 
associated with less usage of financial derivative and better internal control. Concerning the 
financial competence of the board, the results did not show any important connection 
between board competence and firm risk (McNulty et al., 2012).  
Financial experience among autonomous managers may encourage senior 
management to use financial derivative tools to hedge against future uncertainties 
(Acharya et al., 2010). Similarly, Datta et al., (2009) confirmed that board professional 
experience is a key determinant of boards’ ability to make firm strategic decisions regarding 
hedging mechanisms. However, financial experts may affect firm policies beyond more 
accurate disclosure and better performance of the audit committee (Krishnan, 2005) and 
thus managers spend a substantial part of their time advising rather than supervising 
(Adams & Ferreira, 2007). Financial board specialists can identify risks that are more useful 
to shareholders in ordinary times and stimulate management to take on those risks. The 
results conform to that of Dionne and Triki, (2013) which established that having directors 
with a university education on the board is an important determinant of the hedging level. 
H1: Board financial expertise has no significant effect on risk management 
 
4. Research Methodology 
According to International Accounting Standards (IAS) 32 and 39, listed firms must 
disclose the usage of risk management tools in their financial statements. In this regard, a 
longitudinal research design was used and the data were collected from audited financial 
statements of non-financial firms from January 2010 to December 2017. The target 
population of the study was 67 listed firms in Nairobi Securities Exchange as of 31 
December 2017. Based on the inclusion-exclusion criteria, a total of 17 firms were excluded 
thus remaining with 41 listed non-financial firms that fit the requirements of the study. The 
final sample comprised 41 non-financial listed firms and 328 firm-year observations. 
The study used a binary variable as the dependent variable, one for financial 
derivative users and zero for non-users as a tool for risk management. The ordinary least 
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square technique can no longer generate the best linear unbiased estimator when a 
dependent variable is binary. In this situation, a non-linear binary variable adopts the 
maximum likelihood (ML) estimation technique which requires an assumption about 
probability distribution like logistic function. The binary logistic regression model applies in 
the case where the dependent variable is binary and the predictor variables are a mix of a 
categorical and continuous variable and the data not normally distributed (Hosmer and 
Lemeshow, 2013).  
Table 1. Measurement of Variables 
Variables Measure Empirical Studies 
Dependent Variable   
Risk Management 
Dummy variables 1 for 
financial derivative users 
and 0 for non-users 
Geczy et al., 1997; 
Purnanandam, 2008 
Independent Variable   
Board Independence  
The number of non-
executive directors divided 
by the total number of 
directors on the board. 
Ferreira & 
Kirchmaier, (2013) 
CEO Tenure   
The number of years the 
CEO has been in the 
company. 
Souder et al ., (2012) 
Board Financial Expertise 
The number of board 
members with financial 
experience. 
Minton et al., (2014) 
Aebi et al., (2012) 
Control Variable   
Firm  Size Natural log of total assets. Laeven et al.,  (2014) 
Firm Performance Measured as return on assets Chen et al., (2005) 
 
The study proceeds towards testing the proposed hypotheses where the researcher 
analyzed the influence of board independence, CEO tenure, and board financial expertise 
that may have an impact on risk management using binary logistic regression. The effect of 
firm size and firm performance was controlled whose impact on risk management is 
evidenced in the prior literature. Following the work of (Fok et al., 1997; Geczy et al., 1997; 
Allayannis and Ofek, 2001 and Purnanandam, 2008), the study used logistic regression 
analysis to examine the effect of corporate governance attributes on risk management and 
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econometrically, binary logistic regression estimates a multiple linear regression function 
defined as: 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 = 𝛽𝛽0𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 + C + 𝛽𝛽1𝑋𝑋1𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑋𝑋2𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑋𝑋3𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 + ɛ𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙  
where C is Control variable (firm size and firm performance); X1 is Board 
independence; X2 is CEO Tenure; X3 is Board financial expertise; β0 is an intercept 
and β1 – β3 are coefficients of estimates;  𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 is the probability of using 
derivatives as a measure of risk management; and  ɛ𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙  is an error term of the 
model. 
 
5. Results & Findings 
5.1. Descriptive Statistics 
The statistical summary for risk management, board independence, CEO tenure, 
board financial expertise, firm size, and firm performance are presented in Table 2. Findings 
showed that non-financial listed firms had board independence with a (Mean = 0.659, SD = 
0.20, Skewness = 0.059 and Kurtosis = 3.149) implying that the proportion of non-executive 
directors to the total number of directors on the board on average was at 65.9 percent. A 
review of CEOs tenure which is indicated by the number of years the CEO has been in the 
company revealed that CEOs have been in the company between a minimum of 2 years 
and a maximum of 10 years (mean = 4.554 SD = 2.212, Skewness = 0.072 and Kurtosis = 
1.947). This implies that on average the CEOs have been in the company for four years.  
Statistical results of board members with financial expertise revealed that (mean = 
1.198, SD = 1.228, Skewness = 0.714 and Kurtosis = 2.439) implying that members with 
financial expertise are mandated by the shareholders to oversight the complex operations 
of the firm and the risks associated with the firm’s to serve their interests of value 
maximization. More findings revealed that risk management which is a practice of creating 
economic value in a firm by using financial instruments to manage firm risk, exposures, and 
hedge against uncertainties was at a (mean = 0.488, SD = 0.501, skewness = 0.049 and 
kurtosis = 1.002).Statistical results suggest that 48.8 percent of firms have adopted financial 
derivatives instruments as risk management tools, implying that there is relatively low 
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Table 2. Descriptive Results of Study Variables 
Stats Obs Min Max Mean Sd Skewness Kurtosis 
Risk Management 328 0.00 1 0.49 .50 0.05 1.00 
Board Independence 328 0.07 1.5 0.66 .20 -0.06 3.15 
CEOTenure 328 2.00 10 4.55 2.21 0.07 1.95 
Board Financial Expertise 328 0.00 4 1.20 1.23 0.71 2.44 
Firm Size 328 8.25 11.28 9.68 .61 0.07 3.16 
Firm Performance 328 -1.04 0.34 -0.02 .19 -1.96 9.48 
 
5.2. Hypothesis testing 
The hypotheses were tested using a random effect model. As suggested by 
Kohler and Kreuter (2009), the random effect estimator model handles better 
models that contain time-invariant variables which are commonly omitted by the 
fixed-effects model. The statistical findings revealed by the logistic regression 
model showed Pseudo R2=0.2816 implying that approximately 28.16 percent of 
the variation in the output can be explained by the predictor variables in the 
model. The contribution was statistically significant at p<0.05 level of confidence. 
Findings in Table 3 showed that board independence had coefficients of the 
estimate which was negative and statistically significant based on (β=-1.14, 
p<0.05) values. This suggested that there was up to -1.14 unit decline in financial 
risk management for each unit increase in board independence. The results are 
consistent with the findings of Osuoha and Osuoha (2015) who found that board 
independence had a negative and significant effect on the relationship between 
corporate governance and derivatives usage. 
Further, the findings revealed that CEO tenure had coefficients of the 
estimate which was significant and negative based on (β=-0.56, p<0.05) values. As 
such, the longer CEOs serve in the firm, the more the decline in risk management. 
The results conform to the findings of Campbell et al., (2011) on the association 
between CEO tenure and derivatives and they found that CEO tenure was 
significant and negatively related to risk management. 
Finally, the statistical findings revealed that board financial expertise had a 
positive and significant effect on risk management centered on the (β=0.56, 
p<0.05) values. The implication is that an increase in the board's financial 
expertise brings about better management of risk using derivative tools. The 
findings are in line with that of Harris and Raviv (2008) which established that a 
more financially knowledgeable board recognizes risks that are unsound for the 
financial stability of the firm and advise senior managers to avoid such risks. 
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The goodness of fit tests helps to decide whether the model is correctly fit 
which is revealed by the Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness of fit results in Table 3. 
According to Allison, (2014), when the p-value is less than 0.05, then the model is 
rejected and if the p-value greater than 0.05, then the model passes the test, and 
thus the model is said to be fit. The Hosmer-Lemeshow test yielded Pearson chi2 
of 125.36 which has a probability of 0.5741 which is more than 0.05 hence 
implying that the model fits well. 
Table 3. Logistic Regression Analysis 
Logistic regression Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness of fit test 
# Obs 328 Number of observations  328 
LR chi2(5) 52.65 Number of covariate patterns 328 
Prob > chi2 0 Pearson chi2(120) 125.36 
Pseudo R2 0.2816 Prob > chi2  0.5741 
Log likelihood -67.155     
 Risk management  Coef. Std. Err. Z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
Board Independence -1.14 0.3 -3.8 0.00 -1.73 -0.55 
CEO Tenure -0.56 0.21 -2.66 0.01 -0.97 -0.15 
Board Financial Expertise 0.56 0.25 2.29 0.02 0.08 1.04 
Firm Size 1.37 3.26 0.42 0.67 -5.02 7.76 
Firm Performance 0.455 0.19 2.4 0.02 0.08 0.83 
intercept -1.35 0.38 -0.19 0.85 -1559 12.89 
 
6. Conclusion 
Board independence elicited a negative and significant effect on risk management. 
The results revealed that an increase in the proportion of non-executive was detrimental to 
hedging activities. This is so because non-executive directors tend to diversify their 
investment in more than one firm hence, they are unlikely to be at the forefront in the use 
of financial derivative instruments to manage risks. The literature does not reach a clear 
consensus on the impact of board independence on risk management. However, the 
research is opposite to the argument that hedging increases with outside directors. To 
enhance the use of risk management, there is a need for the independent members of the 
board to have a minimum level of financial knowledge (education, experience, and 
accounting) to monitor risk management activities. 
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The statistical findings revealed that CEO tenure is linked with a decline in risk 
management. The implication is that long-tenured CEOs are less likely to use financial 
derivatives to manage risks since they tend to be less receptive to new business ideas that 
require hedging activities. It implies that an increase in CEO tenure means a reduction in 
hedging activities. It is therefore important for CEOs overseeing risk management to 
understand that the utilization of derivatives instruments increases shareholders' value as 
well as their incentives. Also, it is essential to appoint new CEOs once the term of the 
existing ones expires since newly appointed CEOs are more likely to consider risky 
alternatives and are more receptive to new business ideas that enhance firm value. 
Finally, board financial expertise enhances the risk management of non-financial 
firms. The findings suggest that financially knowledgeable members of a board have a 
better understanding of the sophisticated financial tools involved in risk management 
activities hence they engage more actively in hedging the firm’s exposure to risk and to 
enhance its shareholder's value. Board financial expertise is essential to enabling risk 
management and therefore board members must have financial experience to identify 
risks that are more useful to shareholders in ordinary times and promote management to 
take on those risks.  Moreover, all non-financial firms must have at least one independent 
qualified financial expert sitting on the board to help the firm use sophisticated financial 
instruments for hedging. 
 
7. Recommendation 
7.1. Managerial and Policy implication 
The study results have important implications for practicing financial managers. The 
results will form the basis for the understanding of risk management through the use of 
financial derivative instruments for hedging against exposures and thus will be helpful to 
financial managers when making risk management decisions. This is in line with Asghar et 
al., (2018) who found that corporate governance within a firm encourages managers to use 
derivative instruments as risk management tools along with investment, financial, and 
operational strategies for the best interests of the business and its shareholders. This study 
provides policy guidelines for listed firms in Kenya that aim to make optimal use of 
derivative instruments for reducing interest rates, foreign exchange rates, commodity 
prices, and equity price exposures. The study also recommends that policymakers must 
develop a well-established derivative market in Kenya to create awareness of derivatives’ 
usage and to facilitate firms that have high foreign transaction can get benefit by optimally 
utilizing hedging techniques. As a result, it will not only facilitate the firms to achieve their 
primary goal of shareholders’ wealth maximization but may enhance economic growth. 
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7.2. Theoretical implication 
The research extends the literature on risk management by employing financial 
derivatives instruments. This study is among the few that provided insights into a 
comprehensive set of corporate governance attributes such as board independence, CEO 
tenure, and board financial expertise. The study also adds to the strand of corporate 
governance literature by extending the current literature on corporate governance and risk 
management activities. Though this area has been vastly researched in the financial sector, 
there is a dearth of such studies in non-financial firms. The study contributes to this area 
and is the first few studies to document the hedging behavior of firms on corporate 
governance attributes, and financial risk management among listed non-financial in Kenya. 
Further research is needed to explore the roles of directors’ knowledge and experience in 
the processes of risk management. While this study only examined internal governance 
mechanisms, it is possible that external governance factors not explored may affect risk 
management. This points to the need for future researchers to explore the effect of 
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